REALPOLITIK: Afghanistan’s Untold Story, Brzezinski’s Delusion of Eurasian Conquest – By Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould

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– When the Soviet Union crossed their southern border and invaded Afghanistan at Christmas of 1979, few outside the national security establishment of the major western capitals understood the game of deception at play. Dramatized as the greatest threat to peace since World War II by President Jimmy Carter, Afghanistan rolled the clock back thirty years on U.S./Soviet relations, justified the largest buildup of American force since World War II and paved the way for Ronald Reagan’s “conservative revolution” that changed the face of the American economy and its politics.

Absent from the news media coverage of Afghanistan throughout the 1980’s and after was any hint that Afghanistan had for years been at the center of a multinational intrigue that saw the United States and its allies (known by insiders as the Chinese-Iranian-Pakistani-Arabian peninsula Axis) plotting to undermine Afghanistan’s sovereignty while using it as a stepping stone for control of Central Asia.

Following the events of September 11, 2001 Afghanistan would again drastically shift the foundation of American politics, while advancing a foreign policy devoted to endless war and military budgets even larger and more ruinous than those of the 1980’s.

As told by the first Americans to pierce the media blackout surrounding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1981, our book reveals the shocking story of how American policy transformed Afghanistan from a Cold War buffer state into a secure multi-billion dollar technological training base for Islamic terrorism while setting the stage for a privatized heroin industry of historic proportions. The true story of how America’s policy makers undermined American security from within, Invisible History, Afghanistan’s Untold Story provides the sobering facts and details that every American should have known about America’s secret war, but were never told

More info about Invisible History: Afghanistan's Untold Story

America Pivots to Brzezinski’s Delusion of Eurasian Conquest

By Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould

“For the first time in my very long life… we are, and I don’t want to sound alarmist but I am alarmed, closer to the actual possibility of war with Russia than we have ever been since the Cuban missile crisis. That’s how bad it’s been.”  Stephen Cohen on the Tom Hartman show April 2, 2015

Retired Russia historian Stephen Cohen along with a small handful of academics, journalists and former government officials (who believed the Cold War had ended and would never return) point their fingers at the Western Neocon establishment for America’s latest outbreak of what can only be referred to as late stage imperial dementia. Neocons Robert Kagan and wife Victoria Nuland have certainly done their share of the heavy lifting to make Ukraine the staging ground for what increasingly appears to be a NATO blitzkrieg on Moscow. As columnist William Pfaff wrote in one of his final articles (April 1, 2015 Putin and the Neo-Conservatives) “The energy behind the coup in Ukraine and the proposals to deploy Western arms and re-launch the crisis is generally and I think correctly, recognized as the work of the neoconservative alliance in Washington to which President Obama seems to have sub-leased his European policy.” But whatever the determination of the neocon plot to forge ahead with a further destabilization of Russia’s borders, they are only the barking dogs of the master imperialist whose grand design has been slowly creeping over the globe since he stepped into the Oval office as National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter in 1977.

Love him or hate him, Zbigniew Brzezinski stands apart as the inspiration for the Ukraine crisis. His 1997 book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives lays out the blueprint for how American primacists should feel towards drawing Ukraine away from Russia. (p. 46) “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.” He writes. “Without Ukraine, Russia… would then become a predominantly Asian imperial state, more likely to be drawn into debilitating conflicts with aroused Central Asians, who would then be resentful of the loss of their recent independence and would be supported by their fellow Islamic states to the south.”

Brzezinski also makes clear; should the U.S. mishandle the diplomacy and Moscow regains control over Ukraine, “Russia automatically again regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia.” He attributes Russia’s hold over Eurasia and its revived expansionist aims to their own closely held mystical beliefs in “Russian orthodoxy and a special mystical ‘Russian idea.’” (p. 110) As proof he cites numerous Russian thinkers who have “embraced Eurasianism’s mystical emphasis on the special spiritual and missionary role of the Russian people…” (p. 111).

For Brzezinski, “the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia,” but when it comes to mysticism, it might be said that Brzezinski’s impact on the American foreign policy establishment – if not mystical itself – may have infused such a heavy dose of Eurasianism into American policy that it is now proving fatal to the very global primacy Brzezinski himself has fought a lifetime to attain.

Brzezinski’s obsession derives from British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder’s 1904 definition of the Central-Eastern nations of Europe as the “Heartland” or “Pivot Area”, whose geographic position made them “the vital springboards for the attainment of continental domination.” (Grand Chessboard p. 38) Looking forward a hundred years, Brzezinski advances Mackinder’s theories on Eurasian geopolitics from regional to global, with control over the entire Eurasian continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific as central to America’s global primacy. Whether anyone realizes it today or not, the Obama administration’s current campaign against Russia in Ukraine is of Mackinder’s design brought forward by Brzezinski.

To a seasoned expert like Stephen Cohen, the Obama administration’s indictment of Russia for the Ukraine crisis is groundless.  “There is a narrative in this country that this entire crisis was created by Putin and Russia, that he sought to take over Ukraine or destabilize Ukraine and that’s just his first step toward taking back Eastern Europe. It’s complete malarkey. It doesn’t correspond to the facts and above all it has no logic.” But a look back forty years reveals that a lot of Cold War thinking wasn’t exactly fact-based either and it may now be instructive to look for answers to Washington’s current dose of illogic in the covert origins of the U.S. supported 1970s war for Afghanistan.

As the first Americans to gain access to Kabul after the Soviet invasion for an American TV crew in 1981 we got a closeup look at the American narrative supporting President Carter’s “greatest threat to peace since the second world war” and it simply didn’t hold up. What had been presented within days of the December 1979 invasion as an open and shut case of Soviet expansion toward the Persian Gulf by Harvard Professor and Team B Project leader Richard Pipes on the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour could just as easily have been defined as a defensive action well within the Soviets’ legitimate sphere of influence. Three years earlier, Pipes’ Team B Strategic Objectives Panel on the CIA’s estimate of the Soviet threat had been accused of subverting the very process of making national security estimates by inventing threats where they didn’t exist and intentionally skewing its findings along ideological lines. Now that ideology was being presented as fact by America’s Public Broadcasting System.

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