RISE OF THE FOURTH REICH: Nazi Spy-Chief Reinhard Gehlen, BND, and the Indonesian Fascist Coup of 1965

Source – spitfirelist.com

–  The bloody 1965 coup against Sukarno is known to have been largely engi­neered by the CIA. By some accounts, the death toll reached 1,000,000, with the vic­tims includ­ing many lib­er­als, jour­nal­ists, artists, writ­ers and oth­ers viewed with dis­taste by the army. 

A recent issue of Ger­man For­eign Pol­icy (which feeds along the bot­tom of the front page of the web­site) dis­closes that the BND–the Ger­man for­eign intel­li­gence ser­vice and the final incar­na­tion of the Gehlen spy outfit–played a major role in the coup, as well.

The appar­ent BND point man for the Fed­eral Republic’s role in the coup was Rudolf Oebsger-Roder, like so many Gehlen org offi­cers, a vet­eran of the SS. 

The slaugh­ter in Indone­sia proved alto­gether pleas­ing to Gehlen. ” . . . Reflect­ing back, BND founder Gehlen was prais­ing these crimes almost effu­sively. “The sig­nif­i­cance of the Indone­sian army’s suc­cess, which … pur­sued the elim­i­na­tion of the entire Com­mu­nist Party with all con­se­quences and sever­ity, can­not — in my opin­ion — be appraised highly enough,” Gehlen wrote in his 1971 “Memoirs.” . . .”

“Bonn and the Putsch;” german-foreign-policy.com; 10/15/2015.

Germany’s Fed­eral Intel­li­gence Ser­vice (BND) has been heav­ily involved in the 1965 mur­der­ous putsch in Indone­sia — the guest nation of this year’s Frank­furt Book Fair. This was con­firmed in secret doc­u­ments from the Bun­destag, the Ger­man Par­lia­ment. Accord­ing to BND Pres­i­dent at the time, Ger­hard Wessel’s man­u­script for a talk he deliv­ered to a ses­sion of the Bundestag’s “Con­fi­den­tial Com­mit­tee” in June 1968, the BND did more than merely sup­port the Indone­sian mil­i­tary in their blood-soaked “liq­ui­da­tion of the CPI” (Com­mu­nist Party of Indone­sia) — result­ing in the mur­der of hun­dreds of thou­sands, pos­si­bly even mil­lions — with advi­sors, equip­ment and finances. Suharto, who sub­se­quently took power, had even attrib­uted a “large part … of the suc­cess” of the oper­a­tion to the BND. Up to now, mainly the US-American assis­tance to the putsch has been known. The putsch, and the more than 30 year-long dic­ta­tor­ship that fol­lowed — which also had been reli­ably pro­moted by West Ger­many — are impor­tant themes being pre­sented by Indone­sian writ­ers at this year’s Frank­furt Book Fair. To this day, the Ger­man gov­ern­ment has refused to allow an inves­ti­ga­tion of the BND’s sup­port for the putsch and the Indone­sian military’s exces­sive brutality.

Hun­dreds of Thou­sands Dead

The Indone­sian putsch, bring­ing Maj. Gen. Haji Mohamed Suharto to power in Jakarta, began in Octo­ber 1965 as a reac­tion to an attempted coup d’état, killing sev­eral offi­cers on Sep­tem­ber 30. Suharto’s dic­ta­to­r­ial reign lasted until 1998. The attempted coup was falsely attrib­uted to the Com­mu­nist Party of Indone­sia (CPI). Sub­se­quently, the mil­i­tary launched exces­sively bru­tal oper­a­tions against all gen­uine and sus­pected mem­bers and sym­pa­thiz­ers of the com­mu­nist party. Hun­dreds of thou­sands, pos­si­bly even mil­lions, were mur­dered; mil­lions were impris­oned. The exact num­ber is still unknown. The crimes com­mit­ted at the time by the mil­i­tary have never really been brought to light.

50 to 100 Vic­tims Each Night

One of the things never brought to light is what sup­port west­ern pow­ers had given to the Suharto putsch. US com­plic­ity, hav­ing had the best rela­tions to the Indone­sian armed forces, has, to some extent, already been exposed. Accord­ing to experts, for exam­ple, by 1965, around 4,000 Indone­sian offi­cers had been trained in US mil­i­tary instal­la­tions as well as high-ranking offi­cers hav­ing been trained in counter-insurgency on the basis of US field man­u­als at Indonesia’s elite mil­i­tary institutes.[1] Decem­ber 2, 1965, the US ambas­sador gave his con­sent to pro­vid­ing finan­cial sup­port to the “Kap-Gestapu” move­ment, a move­ment — as he put it — “inspired by the army, even though com­prised of civil­ian action groups,” which “shoul­dered the task of the ongo­ing repres­sive mea­sures against Indonesia’s Com­mu­nist Party.“[2] The ambas­sador must have known what this would mean. Novem­ber 13, his employ­ees had passed on infor­ma­tion from the Indone­sian police indi­cat­ing, “between 50 and 100 mem­bers of the CPI in East­ern and Cen­tral Java were being killed each night.” April 15, the embassy had admit­ted, “it did not know if the actual num­ber” of mur­dered CPI activists “was not closer to 100,000 or 1,000,000.” In spite of the mass mur­der, the US ambas­sador in Jakarta reported back to Wash­ing­ton (August 10, 1966) that the author­i­ties in Jakarta had been pro­vided a list of the lead­ing CPI members.[3]

“Reli­able Friend of Germany”

Agen­cies of the West Ger­man gov­ern­ment had also been involved in the putsch. The BND had sup­ported “Indonesia’s mil­i­tary intel­li­gence service’s 1965 defeat of a left-wing putsch in Jakarta, with sub­ma­chine guns, short­wave radios and money (with a total value of 300,000 DM),” reported “Der Spiegel” in March 1971.[4] Twelve weeks later, the mag­a­zine added that “a com­mando of BND men” had “trained mil­i­tary intel­li­gence ser­vice oper­a­tives in Indone­sia” and “relieved their CIA col­leagues, who were under the heavy pres­sure of anti-American propaganda.“[5] By “sup­ply­ing Soviet rifles and Finnish ammu­ni­tion, the BND instruc­tors” were even actu­ally inter­ven­ing in that “civil war.” If one can believe the BND’s founder, Rein­hard Gehlen, Bonn, at the time, had the best con­tacts to lead­ing mil­i­tary offi­cers. In his “Mem­oirs,” pub­lished in 1971, Gehlen wrote, “two of Germany’s reli­able friends” were among the Indone­sian offi­cers, mur­dered Sep­tem­ber 30, includ­ing “the long­time and highly revered mil­i­tary attaché in Bonn, Brig. Gen. Pand­jai­tan.” Dur­ing the putsch, the BND was “in the for­tu­nate posi­tion of being able to pro­vide the West Ger­man gov­ern­ment with timely and detailed reports — from excel­lent sources — … on the progress of those days, which had been so cru­cial for Indonesia.“[6]

An Excel­lent Resident

Other indi­ca­tions have emerged from the research pub­lished by the expert of intel­li­gence ser­vices, Erich Schmidt-Eenboom and the polit­i­cal sci­en­tist, Matthias Ritzi. Their find­ings con­firmed that there was close coor­di­na­tion between the BND and CIA. In April 1961, BND head­quar­ters in Pul­lach had informed the US Cen­tral Intel­li­gence Agency that it had “an excel­lent Chief of Sta­tion” in Jakarta, writes Schmidt-Eenboom. The CIA thought the BND was refer­ring to Rudolf Oebsger-Röder, a for­mer colonel of the SS work­ing in the Reich Secu­rity Cen­tral Office (Reichssicher­heit­shaup­tamt) in Nazi Ger­many, who joined West Germany’s Orga­ni­za­tion Gehlen in 1948 and was later on post in Indone­sia, as a cor­re­spon­dent for the Süd­deutsche Zeitung and the Neue Zürcher Zeitung.[7] The BND had main­tained Oebsger-Röder on its staff until the mid-‘60s. In mid-January 1964, a high-ranking CIA rep­re­sen­ta­tive paid Gehlen a visit and asked him how the West Ger­mans were han­dling the devel­op­ments in Indone­sia, explain Schmidt-Eenboom and Ritzi. Gehlen told him that he is keep­ing Bonn up-to-date, but does not yet know how the chan­cellery intends to proceed.

“A Large Part BND”

The man­u­script for a talk BND Pres­i­dent Ger­hard Wes­sel pre­sented June 21 1968 to the Bundestag’s Con­fi­den­tial Com­mit­tee pro­vides more details. In the form of notes, Wes­sel gave “details of BND activ­i­ties” in sup­port of its Indone­sian part­ner ser­vice, explained Schmidt-Eenboom and Ritzi. Explic­itly the man­u­script explains that “the close ties already in place to the Indone­sian strate­gic ND (intel­li­gence ser­vice) by Octo­ber 1965, had facil­i­tated sup­port (advi­sors, equip­ment, money) to Indonesia’s ND and its spe­cial mil­i­tary organs dur­ing the elim­i­na­tion of the CPI (and Sukarno’s dis­em­pow­er­ment — con­trol and sup­port of demonstrations).“[8] The “CPI’s elim­i­na­tion” included the assas­si­na­tion of hun­dreds of thou­sands of gen­uine and sus­pected mem­bers and sym­pa­thiz­ers of the Indone­sian CP. Accord­ing to the man­u­script, BND Pres­i­dent Wes­sel con­tin­ued his speech to the Con­fi­den­tial Com­mit­tee, “in the opin­ion of Indone­sian politi­cians and mil­i­tary offi­cers ((Suharto, Nasu­tion, Sul­tan) a large part thanks to the BND.”

Praise from Pullach

Reflect­ing back, BND founder Gehlen was prais­ing these crimes almost effu­sively. “The sig­nif­i­cance of the Indone­sian army’s suc­cess, which … pur­sued the elim­i­na­tion of the entire Com­mu­nist Party with all con­se­quences and sever­ity, can­not — in my opin­ion — be appraised highly enough,” Gehlen wrote in his 1971 “Memoirs.“[9]

Berlin’s Pri­or­i­ties

The Ger­man gov­ern­ment is still refus­ing to shed light on Germany’s par­tic­i­pa­tion in these crimes. In a par­lia­men­tary inter­pel­la­tion, the gov­ern­ment was asked if it has knowl­edge of “for­eign gov­ern­ments, intel­li­gence ser­vices or other orga­ni­za­tions’ direct or indi­rect sup­port of the mas­sacres.” In Mai 2014, it responded, “after a thor­ough assess­ment, the gov­ern­ment con­cludes that it can­not give an open answer.” It is “imper­a­tive” to keep the “requested infor­ma­tion” secret. The “pro­tec­tion of sources” is a “prin­ci­ple of pri­mary impor­tance to the work of intel­li­gence services.“[10] For the Ger­man gov­ern­ment, the Indone­sian civil society’s need to have infor­ma­tion on for­eign sup­port for the immense mass mur­der is of less impor­tance than its “pro­tec­tion of sources.”

[1] Rainer Wern­ing: Putsch nach “Pütschchen”. junge Welt 01.10.2015.
[2], [3] Rainer Wern­ing: Der Archipel Suharto. In: Kon­flikte auf Dauer? Osnabrücker Jahrbuch Frieden und Wis­senschaft, her­aus­gegeben vom Ober­bürg­er­meis­ter der Stadt Osnabrück und dem Präsi­den­ten der Uni­ver­sität Osnabrück. Osnabrück 2008, S. 183–199.
[4] Her­mann Zolling, Heinz Höhne: Pul­lach intern. Der Spiegel 11/1971.
[5] Her­mann Zolling, Heinz Höhne: Pul­lach intern. Der Spiegel 23/1971.
[6] Rein­hard Gehlen: Der Dienst. Erin­nerun­gen 1942–1971. Mainz/Wiesbaden 1971.
[7], [8] Matthias Ritzi, Erich Schmidt-Eenboom: Im Schat­ten des Drit­ten Reiches. Der BND und sein Agent Richard Christ­mann. Berlin 2011. See Review: Im Schat­ten des Drit­ten Reiches.
[9] Rein­hard Gehlen: Der Dienst. Erin­nerun­gen 1942–1971. Mainz/Wiesbaden 1971.
[10] Antwort der Bun­desregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abge­ord­neten Andrej Hunko, Jan van Aken, Sevim Dağde­len, weit­erer Abge­ord­neter und der Frak­tion DIE LINKE. Deutscher Bun­destag Druck­sache 18/1554, 27.05.2014.

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